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State Civil Penalties for Obscenity
Violations: The Constitutionality of Pretrial
Seizure of Obscene Publications
Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989).
I., INTRODUCTION
Virtually all states have enacted Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statutes.' Indiana's RICO statute
includes obscenity offenses2 as a predicate for racketeering viola-
tions which can be used to invoke Indiana's Civil Remedies for
Racketeering Activity (CRRA)3 statute when the state seeks civil
injunctive relief." The CRRA statute allows for, inter alia, the for-
feiture of all the offender's property that "was used in the course
of, intended for use in the course of, derived from, or realized
through"' the furtherance of racketeering activity. In addition, In-
diana statutes prohibit the distribution of obscene material," viola-
tions of which can be used by the state as a basis for prosecution
under the state's RICO statute.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
to review two Indiana cases which presented issues of the constitu-
tionality of Indiana's RICO statute as applied to obscenity viola-
1. See Comment, RICO's Forfeiture Provision: A First Amendment Restraint on
Adult Bookstores, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 418 (1988).
2. Section 35-45-6-1 of the Indiana Code states that "'Racketeering activity' means to
commit, attempt to commit, or to conspire to commit a violation, or aiding and abetting a
violation of ... [the obscenity statute] .... " IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-1 (Burns 1985).
Indiana Code 35-49-3 is Indiana's obscenity statute. Section 35-45-6-2 of the Indiana Code
specifies the penalties for violation of section 35-45-6-1. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-2 (Burns
1985). Specifically, a violation of this section is a class C felony. See infra note 29 for the
text of the substantive section of the Indiana RICO statute.
3. The CRRA provides civil remedies for violations of the Indiana RICO statute. IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-4-30.5-1 (Burns 1985).
4. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-30.5-2 (Burns 1985).
5. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-30.5-3 (Burns 1985). See infra note 66 for the text of the
statute.
6. The Indiana statutes prohibit the importation or distribution of obscene matter.
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-49-3-1 (Burns 1985). In addition, activities related to obscene perform-
ances are classified as class D felonies. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-49-3-2 (Burns 1985). Obscene
materials are defined by applying, essentially, the same test as in Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973). IND. CODE ANN. § 35-49-2-1 (Burns 1985). See also infra note 26 (providing
the text of the Miller test).
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tions. The first case, 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, involved the selling
of allegedly obscene publications from three stores operated by
Fort Wayne Books, Inc.8 The state alleged that obscene material
remaining in the stores was being used to further the store's racke-
teering activity. Thus, the state sought civil injunctive relief and
invoked the CRRA statute and the state's pretrial seizure proce-
dure to seize all of the store's property, real and personal.9 The
trial court, in an ex parte hearing, considered testimony in support
of the state's petition for pretrial seizure and issued an order au-
thorizing the county sheriff to padlock the stores and haul away
the stores' contents. 10 Subsequently, Fort Wayne Books, Inc. peti-
tioned the trial court to vacate the seizure order on federal consti-
tutional grounds.1 This attempt failed, but the trial court certified
the constitutional question to the Indiana Court of Appeals which
held that the RICO/CRRA provisions violate the United States
Constitution. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals and upheld "the constitutionality of the CRRA statute as
a general proposition and the pretrial seizure of Fort Wayne
Books' stores as a specific matter.""' The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari"' to consider the constitutional issues
raised by the pretrial procedure and, in a plurality opinion, re-
versed the Indiana Supreme Court's ruling.
The second case, State v. Sappenfield,6 concerned a direct
application of the state's RICO statute to the distribution of ob-
7. 504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987). The Indiana Court of Appeals consolidated 4447 Corp.
v. Goldsmith and Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana. 479 N.E.2d 578 (Ind. App. 1985). Only
Fort Wayne Books, Inc. petitioned for review. Thus, the discussion of 4447 Corp. in this
Note refers to the issues presented in Fort Wayne Books.
8. The state brought thirty-nine criminal charges against Fort Wayne Books, Inc. for
selling allegedly obscene publications. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916, 921
(1989).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The Indiana Supreme Court answered in the negative both of the questions
certified by the Indiana Court of Appeals. The questions were stated as follows:
(a) Does the application for seizure upon probable cause shown ex parte as pro-
vided for by I.C. 34-4-30.5-3(b) violate due process guarantees provided by the
Indiana and United States Constitutions.
(b) Is the order of seizure issued March 19, 1984, which is based upon enumer-
ated criminal convictions a violation of the First Amendment.
Id. at 928, n.9. However, the United States Supreme Court did not consider the due process
issues becasue it disposed of the claim on first amendment grounds. Id.
13. Id. at 922.
14. 108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988).
15. 505 N.E.2d 504 (Ind. App. 1987).
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scene material. The state filed six misdemeanor obscenity charges
and two felony RICO charges against Sappenfield, the owner and
operator of an adult bookstore.16 The trial court dismissed the
RICO counts stating that "the RICO statute was unconstitution-
ally vague as applied to obscenity predicate offenses.' 17 However,
the Indiana Court of Appeals, following the precedent set by the
Indiana Supreme Court in 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, reinstated the
RICO charges." The Indiana Supreme Court refused to review the
case. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari" to con-
sider the constitutional issues raised by the application of the
state's RICO statute to obscenity cases and affirmed the Indiana
Court of Appeal's ruling.
Section II of this Note describes the United States Supreme
Court's consideration of the constitutionality of the Indiana RICO
statute as applied to obscenity predicate offenses. Central to the
issues presented is the first amendment protection of materials
bought and sold in adult bookstores. Specifically, the Court consid-
ered whether the Indiana RICO statute was so vague as to pre-
clude first amendment protection of free speech and whether the
felony penalties for violation of the Indiana RICO statute have a
chilling effect on adult book store's exercising their first amend-
ment rights. Section III of this Note analyzes the constitutionality
of the seizure of adult book store property, including presump-
tively protected material. Indiana's RICO statute, read narrowly,
allows such seizure without the heightened showing of probable
cause required when first amendment protected material is
involved.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF INDIANA'S RICO STATUTE
The United States Supreme Court first considered the consti-
tutionality of Indiana's RICO statute as presented in Sap-
penfield.2 0 Sappenfield presented two main arguments in support
16. Fort Wayne Books, 109 S. Ct. at 922.
17. Id. Predicate offenses are listed in the Indiana RICO statute. See infra note 29 for
text of the RICO statute.
18. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989) (citing State v. Sap-
penfield, 505 N.E.2d 504, 506 (Ind. App. 1987)).
19. 108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988).
20. The Court based jurisdiction on an exemption to the finality rule. 109 S. Ct. at
923. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) describes four categories where a
judgment is final even when further proceedings are pending in state court. The Court here
found that the present case falls under the fourth category: refusal to review the claim
"might seriously erode federal policy." 109 S. Ct. at 923 (quoting Cox, 420 U.S. at 482-483).
Justices Blackmun and O'Connor filed separate concurring opinions but dissented from the
19891
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of its contention that the application of Indiana's RICO statute
was unconstitutional when predicated on obscenity violations.21
First, Sappenfield claimed that the RICO statute is unconstitu-
tionally vague as applied to enterprises for the distribution of ob-
scene material.2 2 Second, Sappenfield argued that the penalties
under the RICO statute are so "severe that the statute lacks a
'necessary sensitivity to first amendment rights.' "23 The Court re-
jected both of Sappenfield's arguments and found that Indiana's
RICO statute is not unconstitutional as applied to obscenity predi-
cate offenses.
A. Unconstitutional Vagueness
The Indiana obscenity statute is completely incorporated by
reference into the state's RICO statute2 4 which defines a pattern of
multiple violations of substantive crimes, one of which is the distri-
bution of obscene materials, as racketeering activity. The Court
stated that the RICO statute cannot be unconstitutionally vague
25
as applied to obscenity predicate offenses if the underlying obscen-
ity statute is not unconstitutionally vague. Because Indiana's ob-
scenity statute conformed with the standards set forth in Miller v.
California,2 the Court found it not to be unconstitutionally vague.
majority's finding of jurisdiction. 109 S. Ct. at 930 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part); 109 S. Ct. at 930 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall agreed with the jurisdictional grounds but dis-
sented from the result. 109 S. Ct. at 930 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
21. Fort Wayne Books, 109 S. Ct. at 924.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
25. Fort Wayne Books, 109 S. Ct. at 925. The Court stated that Sappenfield cannot be
convicted of the RICO charges without first being adjudicated guilty of violating the obscen-
ity statute. Id.
26. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Miller Court set out the following three part standard for
trial courts to use in determining whether material is obscene:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted). In addition, the Court in Miller held that obscene
materials are not protected by the first amendment but added:
Under the holdings announced today, no one will be subject to prosecution for
the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict patently
offensive "hard core" sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating state
law, as written or construed. We are satisfied that these specific prerequisites
will provide fair notice to a dealer in such materials that his public and commer-
[Vol. 7:139
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The Court reasoned that the RICO statute is "less vague than any
state obscenity law"'27 because the RICO statute requires a pattern
of obscenity violations which makes the RICO statute "more lim-
ited than the scope of the state's obscenity statute.""2  Therefore,
the Court concluded that the Indiana RICO statute is not uncon-
stitutionally vague as applied to obscenity predicate offenses.
B. The Necessary Sensitivity to first amendment Rights
Indiana's RICO statute provides penalties under the state's
felony statute2 9 which imposes a possible five year prison sentence
and a $10,000 fines° for those offenders found guilty of racketeer-
ing. On the other hand, violations of the state's obscenity statute
are punishable as misdemeanors with a maximum one year prison
sentence and a $5,000 fine.3 1 Sappenfield in this case would face a
maximum of ten years in prison and a $20,000 fine for conviction
of the two felony RICO violations. However, Sappenfield would
face six years in prison and a $30,000 fine for conviction of the six
misdemeanor obscenity violations.32 Therefore, Sappenfield argues,
cial activities may bring prosecution.
Id. at 15.
27. Fort Wayne Books, 109 S. Ct. at 925 n.7.
28. Id.
29. The Indiana RICO statute states:
(a) A Person:
(1) Who has knowingly or intentionally received any proceeds directly or indi-
rectly derived from a pattern of racketeering activity, and who uses or invests
those proceeds or the proceeds derived from them to acquire an interest in real
property or to establish or to operate an enterprise;
(2) Who through a pattern of racketeering activity, knowingly or intentionally
acquires or maintains, either directly or indirectly, an interest or control of real
property or an enterprise; or
(3) Who is employed or associated with an enterprise, and who knowingly or
intentionally conducts or otherwise participates in the activities of that enter-
prise through a pattern of racketeering activity;
commits corrupt business influence, a Class C felony.
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-2 (Burns 1985). The felony section states:
A person who commits a class C felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of
five [5] years, with not more than three [3] years added for aggravating circum-
stances or not more than three [3] years subtracted for mitigating circumstances;
in addition, he may be fined not more than ten thousnad dollars [$10,000].
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-6.
30. Id.
31. The Indiana Obscenity Statute states that the importation or distribution of ob-
scene matter is a class A misdemeanor. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-49-3-1 (Burns 1985).
32. Fort Wayne Books, 109 S. Ct. at 925. Although the aggregate punishment for this
petitioner for committing a Class C felony does not appear to be much different that the
punishment for committing a Class A misdemeanor, the individual penalties are quite dif-
ferent. See supra text accompanying notes 30 & 31.
1989]
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the RICO penalties lack the necessary sensitivity to the values in-
herent in the first amendment and "have an improper chilling ef-
fect on first amendment freedoms."33
The Court rejected Sappenfield's argument and recognized the
disparity in the sanctions under the two statutes, but saw no con-
stitutional significance in the differences. 4 The Court has upheld
criminal sanctions for obscenity violations as constitutional in
other cases's and, in this case, there was no difference between the
sanctions under the Indiana RICO statute and the sanctions al-
lowed by the Court in other state proceedings. The Court found
that the "deterrence of the sale of obscene materials is a legitimate
end of state anti-obscenity laws '1"e and that this deterrence is ex-
actly what the Indiana statute was designed to provide. The logical
result of such a statute is a tendency toward self-censorship by
adult book sellers and a reduction in the proliferation of obscene
material. Consequently, the Court concluded that "[tihe mere as-
sertion of some possible self-censorship resulting from a statute is
not enough to render an obscenity law unconstitutional under
[United States Supreme Court] precedents"" and the Constitution
of the United States does not bar the inclusion of obscenity viola-
tions as predicate offenses under the Indiana RICO statute.3"
C. The Court Rejects Sappenfield's Other Grounds
Sappenfield set forth two additional grounds in support of its
contention that the Indiana RICO statute is unconstitutional as
applied to obscenity violations.59 First, Sappenfield argued that the
RICO statute was unconstitutional because it allowed convictions
on non-successive dates in jurisdictions other than the jurisdiction
where the charges were brought. The Court rejected this argument
and found that the first amendment does not require affirmed, suc-
cessive convictions in non-obscenity cases, and therefore, it rea-
soned, no such requirement can exist in obscenity cases. "' The
33. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916, 925 (1989).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 925 n.8 (1989) (citing Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 296, n.3 (1977) (5
year prison term and $5,000 fine for first offense; 10 year prison term and $10,000 fine for
each subsequent violation); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 464-465, n.2 (1966) (5
year prison term and $5,000 fine)).
36. Fort Wayne Books, 109 S. Ct. at 925.
37. Id. at 926
38. Id. The Court decided that Sappenfield's argument that the RICO statute was
unconstitutional because of the severity of the penalties under the CRRA was not ripe. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985)).
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Court reasoned that the first amendment is satisfied by a proper
standard of proof and, as such, the Court refused to require states
to impose "warning shot" requirements before the state can bring
felony obscenity charges.41 Further, the Court held that the juris-
dictional requirement contention lacked merit because Sap-
penfield's offenses all took place in the same jurisdiction, and be-
cause requiring all RICO violations to occur in the same
jurisdiction prior to subjecting the violator to RICO charges would
"turn the RICO statute on its head."4
Finally, the Court rejected Sappenfield's argument that the
RICO statute was unconstitutional because it did not allow for an
immediate adversarial hearing on the question of obscenity.'3 The
Court found that Sappenfield did not request such a hearing.
Moreover, the items in question were purchased rather than seized
by undercover police officers." Therefore, consistent with Supreme
Court precedent, 5 the Court concluded that such purchases were
not seizures of expressive materials and did not "trigger constitu-
tional concerns."''6 However, the Court warned that the pretrial
seizure of presumptively protected material is unconstitutional. 47
41. Id. (quoting the amicus curiae brief filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the
United States which argued that "this Court has never required a state to fire warning
shots, in the form of misdemeanor prosecutions, before it may bring felony charges for dis-
tributing obscene materials.").
42. The Court was referring to the jurisdictional requirement as effectively "barring
RICO prosecutions of large national enterprises that commit single predicate offenses in
numerous jurisdictions." Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916, 926 (1989).
43. Id. at 927.
44. Id. The assumption is that the Court would consider the constitutionality of the
taking of bookstore property if the property were in fact seized, not purchased. See supra
notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
45. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985). In Maryland, an undercover detective
purchased allegedly obscene material from a sales clerk with marked currency. The Court
held that such a purchase was not a seizure of property and stated:
The sale is not retroactively transformed into a warrantless search by virtue of
the officer's subjective intent to retrieve the purchase money to use as evidence.
Assuming, arguendo, that the retrieval of the money incident to the arrest was
wrongful, the proper remedy is restitution or suppression of the $50 bill as evi-
dence of the purchase, not the exclusion from the evidence of the previously
purchased magazines.
Id. at 463.
46. Fort Wayne Books, 109 S. Ct. at 927.
47. See infra notes 48-69 and accompanying text.
1989]
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III. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF INDIANA'S SEIZURE PROCEDURE:
FIRST AMENDMENT AND FOURTH AMENDMENT TENSION
The first amendment4' protects allegedly obscene materials
from pretrial ex parte seizure while the fourth amendment 9 allows
the use of such seizure procedures to preserve evidence. The Court
in Fort Wayne was confronted with the tension between these two
amendments: should a pretrial seizure procedure stand where the
seizure effectively takes the materials out of circulation, but where
the seizure also preserves the evidence necessary to prosecute.
under the RICO statute. These two interconnected constitutional
provisions directly impact the constitutionality of the pretrial
seizure of allegedly obscene materials.
The first amendment protects allegedly obscene material from
being seized unless the seizure is for the express purpose of deter-
mining the question of obscenity. 0 This safeguard protects the ob-
scene material from being taken out of circulation prior to a deter-
mination of its obscene nature.8 1 On the other hand, the general
rule under the fourth amendment with respect to the seizure of
material is that "all contraband, instrumentalities, and evidence of
crimes may be seized on probable cause (and even without a war-
rant in various circumstances)"52 in order to preserve evidence.
But, when the material subject to seizure is "presumptively pro-
48. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,
or the right of the people peacably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievance.
U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
49. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
50. Fort Wayne Books, 109 S. Ct. at 927 (citing Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S.
717 (1961); A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Lees Art Theatre,
Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (1968)). In fact, Indiana law provides for a preliminary adver-
sary hearing for determining whether seized material is obscene. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-49-2-4
(Burns 1985). However, this section is invoked only when materials are seized or purchased,
or the defendant is arrested, under the obscenity statute, not the RICO statute. IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-49-2-4(a) (Burns 1985). In addition, an Indiana law requires a warrant to issue
prior to arrest of seizure and restricts seizure to "ft]he quantity of matter seized may en-
compass no more than is reasonably necessary for the purpose of obtaining evidence." IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-49-2-3 (Burns 1985).
51. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973).
52. Fort Wayne Books, 109 S. Ct. at 927.
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tected by the first amendment,"" the general rule does not apply."
The United States Supreme Court considered the delicate inter-
play between the first and fourth amendments in its review of 4447
Corp. v. Goldsmith.
A. Seizure of Bookstore Property under the Fourth
Amendment
Pursuant to the Indiana trial court's order, the county sheriff
padlocked the doors of the Fort Wayne bookstore and seized its
contents.55 Such seizures are proper under Indiana's RICO and
CRRA statutes as a means of procuring and preserving evidence of
alleged RICO violations." The United States Supreme Court as-
sumed without deciding that, in general, the property of book-
stores may be seized without violating the United States Constitu-
tion;5 1 but,it cautioned that the state must determine prior to
seizure that the material actually was used in the furtherance of a
pattern of racketeering activity. 8 In order to make this determina-
tion, the trial court must decide whether the seized material is ob-
scene, violating the state's obscenity statute and, therefore, violat-
ing the RICO statute. In its consideration of Sappenfield, the
Supreme Court decided that an implicit tenet of an individual's
first amendment right to free speech is the corresponding restric-
tion on the state prohibiting seizure of otherwise protected speech
materials under the fourth amendment."
53. Id.
54. Id. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979). In Lo-Ji Sales, a group of
law enforcement officers entered the premises of an adult book seller and seized articles
pursuant to a search warrant prepared by the Town Justice, who assisted the officers during
the search. The officers seized many articles not specified in the warrant. The Court stated:
We have repeatedly said that a warrant authorized by a neutral and detached
judicial officer is a more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the
hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Id. at 326.
Further, the Court added that "[C]ourts will scrutinize any large-scale seizure of books,
films, or other materials presumptively protected under the First Amendment to be certain
that the requirement of A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964) and Marcus v.
Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961) are fully met . Id. at 328.
55. Fort Wayne Books, 109 S. Ct. at 921.
56. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
57. Fort Wayne Books, 109 S. Ct. at 928.
58. Id.
59. Id.
19891
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B. Circumvention of First Amendment Doctrines
The Indiana RICO and CRRA statutes were used by the state
to seize allegedly obscene materials only when the use of the ob-
scene materials was found to be in the furtherance of racketeering
activity without a determination of the material's obscene nature."
The Indiana Supreme Court found that the seizure of Fort
Wayne's property was not an attempt to "restrain the future dis-
tribution of presumptively protected speech but rather to disgorge
assets acquired through racketeering activity.""1 The court rea-
soned that it was not relevant that the seized material was or was
not obscene."'
In contrast, the United States Supreme Court did not find
that the Indiana statutes actually were invoked by the state to
sidestep the first amendment protections, but found that the
seizures were violative of the constitution because "it is incontesta-
ble that these proceedings were begun to put.an end to the sale of
obscenity at the three bookstores." 6 In other words, the Court
stated that probable cause, established ex parte, is not enough to
seize first amendment materials even if the materials are allegedly
obscene. Thus, the Court concluded that the special rules which
apply to protected speech being removed from circulation must be
invoked.6
C. Pretrial Seizure is Unconstitutional
Prior to the seizure of Fort Wayne Books's property, the trial
court adjudicated the predicate crimes under the RICO statute."
At the pretrial hearing conducted pursuant to the state's seizure
petition, the prosecution was required to establish by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the materials should be seized." How-
60. Id.
61. Id. (citing 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 504 N.E.2d 559, 565 (Ind. 1987)).
62. 4447 Corp., 504 N.E.2d at 564-565.
63. Fort Wayne Books, 109 S. Ct. at 929.
64. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
66. Subsection (a) of the Indiana CRRA statute provides in pertinent part:
Upon a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the property in ques-
tion was used in the course of, intended for use in the course of, or derived from,
or realized through, conduct in violation of IC 35-45-6-2, the court shall order
the property forfeited to the state, and shall specify the manner of disposition of
the property including the manner of disposition if the property is not transfera-
ble for value. The court shall order forfeitures and dispositions under this sec-
tion with due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-30.5-3(a) (Burns 1985) (emphasis added). Subsection (b) provides:
[Vol. 7:139
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ever, when materials are protected by the first amendment, mere
probable cause is not enough." If the state had predicated its
seizure request on the Indiana obscenity statute, the state would
have had to prove the obscenity violations prior to, or shortly after,
the seizure. 8 On the other hand, under the RICO statute, the state
simply had to show that there was probable cause to seize the
materials due to their being used in the furtherance of possible
RICO violations.6 9 The United States Supreme Court found that
"[tihe fact that the [state's] motion for seizure was couched as one
under the Indiana RICO law-instead of being under the substan-
tive obscenity statute-is unavailing. '7 0 The Court reasoned that
the manner or means in which restraint on free speech is charac-
terized is of little consequence. 1
The United States Supreme Court held that the pretrial
seizure procedure under the Indiana statutes is unconstitutional
because it took protected materials out of circulation without the
proper procedural safeguards." The Court stated that the state
had "not proved whether the seizure was actually warranted under
the Indiana CRRA and RICO statutes."'
IV. CONCLUSION
Obscenity statutes which are incorporated into state RICO
statutes must be specific and non-vague in order for the RICO
statute to withstand constitutional scrutiny. If the underlying ob-
scenity statute abides by the guidelines set forth in Miller v. Cali-
fornia, then the RICO statute, which is inherently less vague than
the underlying statute, will not be unconstitutionally vague.
In addition, when a state seizes property pursuant to its RICO
statute, the Court will determine the constitutionality of the pre-
When an action is filed under subsection (a), the prosecutor may move for an
order to have property subject to forfeiture seized by a law enforcement agency.
The judge shall issue such an order upon a showing of probable cause to believe
that a violation of Indiana Code 35-4-30.5-2 involving the property in question
has occurred.
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-30.5-3(b) (Burns 1985) (emphasis added).
67. Id. See also New York v. P.J. Video, 475 U.S. 868 (1979) (stating that probable
cause determined pursuant to affidavits expressing the "probability or substantial chance of
criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity" is the proper standard to be ap-
plied when warrants are issued to seize presumptively protected material).
68. Fort Wayne Books, 109 S. Ct. at 929. See also supra note 49.
69. See supra note 66.
70. Fort Wayne Books, 109 S. Ct. at 929.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 929-930.
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trial procedure based on the characterization of the material
seized. When the material is presumptively protected by the first
amendment, the Court will require stricter safeguards notwith-
standing the constitutionality of seizing property pursuant to the
RICO statutes. The Court's decision in Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v.
Indiana, although not groundbreaking nor unprecedented, sends a
message to all states that incorporate substantive statutes into
their RICO statutes: if a violation of the substantive statute leads
to a pretrial seizure of property under the RICO statute, the con-
stitutional protections of free speech cannot be sidestepped.
Michael R. Hanrahan*
* B.S., 1980, University of Wisconsin-Madison; J.D. Candidate, 1990, University of
Miami School of Law. The author expresses his sincere gratitude to Robert B. Miller for his
support and encouragement.
[Vol. 7:139
12
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 8
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol7/iss1/8
